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Pentagon Ju-Jitsu: reshaping in the field of propaganda 
 
Introduction  
Events since 9/11 coincided with an explosion of the internet and accelerated forces of 
globalisation, which brought accompanying pressures and opportunities1 alike - for 
citizens, governments, private corporations, groups and movements with violent or 
peaceful intent, whistleblowers and other important actors. Within this changing 
landscape cultural struggles occurred between agents within the field of propaganda - 
between those seeking to define how propaganda wars of the future would be fought 
alongside changes in coercive elements of military action, strategies for social control 
and stability arrangements. For counter-terrorism, US government planners at the 
start of the period began to argue existing propaganda doctrine and laws were out-
dated; defined by their emergence in an old-media system, others sought to find a way 
to reassert the status quo (Briant, 2015). This analysis draws on Bourdieu to aid 
analysis; even though the propaŐĂŶĚŝƐƚƐ ?ĨŝĞůĚŝƐĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŝŶĂĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
within the field of power, limiting its autonomy, it remains a field 'marked by struggles 
ƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇŵŽĚŝĨǇ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌďĂůĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?,ŝůŐĞƌƐ ?DĂŶŐŚĞǌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
 
One important change concerned the traditional distinctions between propaganda for 
foreign audiences - Public Diplomacy and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) - and 
propaganda for the US public and international media - Public Affairs (PA). Traditional 
                                                          
1. Including media convergence, online leaks and cyber attacks, hyper-transparency and mass-
surveillance 
rules were seen as obstructing effective propaganda at home and abroad. Practices 
were ultimately coordinated to ensure messages would not contradict, and to 
maintain strategic control of messages for different audiences, particularly online. But 
'Strategic communication' and the 'merging' of PSYOP and PA raised concern in 
academia and beyond (eg. Gardiner, 2003; Miller, January 2004; Snow and Taylor, 
2006; Briant, 2015). Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) in the Pentagon saw in this threats to 
their credibility and sought to retain control of the process. This article engages in 
deep exploration of this struggle ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚĚƌĂǁŝŶŐŽŶŽƵƌĚŝĞƵ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů
model of cultural production. It shows how PSYOP and Information Operations (IO) 
personnel2 struggled with Public Affairs over the adaptation of systems operating in 
concert and how change occurred in ƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚŝƐƚƐ ? ‘ĨŝĞůĚ ?.  
 
The US traditionally divided propaganda capabilities according to audience, 
sensitivity of operation, and extent of persuasion, with external propaganda permitting 
more aggressive persuasion (particularly where directed toward enemies), and belief 
in the 'fourth estate' allowing some scope for media debate domestically. One reason 
given is transparency and ensuring domestically (and between allies) that propaganda 
rĞŵĂŝŶƐ ‘ƵŶĐŽŶƚĂŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ?ďǇŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ ?Traditionally then, 
military PSYOP - for foreign and enemy audiences was kept distinct from PA and Public 
                                                          
2 Information Operations (IO) is the integrated employment of different capabilities including PSYOP, 
Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, Military Deception and Operational Security. Some 
personnel interviewed within this article are IO personnel rather than just PSYOP, however, as they are 
discussing PSYOP, and where possible to ĂǀŽŝĚĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌ/ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŚĞůĂďĞů ‘W^zKW ? in 
analysis, but leave  ‘IO ?ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚƋƵŽƚĞƐ ?titles and where the designation is important. 
Diplomacy (for foreign audiences).3 Another, operational, reason underpinned 
targeting: messages not tailored for a specific audience are widely considered less 
effective. The transformation in global media and global conflict presented operational 
reasons compelling practitioners to change audience targeting norms, putting these in 
tension with 'ethical' justifications often publicly emphasised. 
  
This article focuses on the struggles to overcome what were seen as 'out-dated' 
systems: pressing through internet policy to coordinate different online propaganda 
forms and overcome discordance in messaging. It presents new evidence of how 
concerns raised by PA were fought by PSYOP personnel, and ultimately marginalised. 
Wider public debate was resisted and largely confined to professional or industry 
forums. This pattern of social change echoes what might be predicted by Bourdieu; as 
,ŝůŐĞƌƐ ?DĂŶŐŚĞǌƉƵƚŝƚ ? ?ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? Win this case PSYOP  W  ‘ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ
conservation strategies that involve the demand for change, while the dominated 
ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? WPA  W  ‘ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƐƵďǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƚŚe demand for the 
maintenance of their threatened rights' (2015: 15). At onset both are dominant actors 
within their field, there is not a clear hierarchy of dominant and dominated, however, 
the proximity to power is such that the maintenance of the established order, through 
adjustment of practices would exert such pressure as to prevail, and resistance 
resulted in an adjustment of key actors' relative power. Bourdieu indicates change in 
                                                          
3 Snow and Taylor called it a 'democratic propaganda model' (2006: 390) has been far from democratic 
and other authors have pointed to the weakness of such claims (eg Miller and Sabir, 2012) or 
demonstrated harsh realities underpinning power and persuasion during 20th Century conflicts (inc. 
Dorril, 2002; Weiner 2008; Herman and Chomsky, 2008; Bacevich, 2006; French, 2012). 
the service of preserving structures of positions is sociologically more probable than 
change oriented towards transforming them.  
 
PSYOP was 're-branded' in 2010, as a hybrid communication form Military 
Information Support Operations  ?D/^K ? ?D/^K ?ƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ similarity to PD, reflects the 
broader role of Defense in a 'global counter-terrorism campaign', which expanded the 
range of Department of Defense (DOD) activities.4 Legislation was amended in 2012 to 
allow Public Diplomacy media previously restricted domestically to be disseminated 
within the US (Smith-Mundt Act, 2012). It is crucially important to understand how 
changes in practise occur within government, particularly for propaganda, where a key 
role is played by informal planning (Briant, 2015). Challenges like those raised by new 
media demand a public reappraisal of propaganda governance, for which governments 
must allow greater transparency in order to enable debate, legal judgement and 
independent academic enquiry. 
 
Methodology 
The paper will draw on emails and interviews with 11 elite sources from the US 
including personnel working since 9/11 in foreign policy, defence and intelligence.5 The 
                                                          
4 Consolidation in 1999 of the USIA into the State Department was partly to end the appearance of a 
centralised 'propaganda organisation'. Yet investment in capabilities at the Pentagon became so great as 
to dwarf other efforts.  
 
5 With gratitude to Research Assistants Elizabeth Balderston and Keirstan Pawson for assistance with 
transcription. 
paper focuses on key figures involved in US propaganda during a period of 
contestation when the traditional distinctions between propaganda for foreign 
audiences - Public Diplomacy and PSYOP - and propaganda for the US public and 
international media - PA - were being challenged and reshaped (See Gardiner, 2003; 
Miller, January 2004; Snow and Taylor, 2006; Briant 2015). The article builds on 
existing elite interviews with American foreign policy, defense and intelligence 
personnel, deepening insight into this struggle.6  
 
Fluid Propaganda Audiences 
 A globalised, fluid media environment means isolating audiences 
geographically and targeting them with different messages can be difficult. Media 
flowing across borders resulted in contradiction, destroying credibility. As Former Chief 
of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, Department of State (2002-2005) Lawrence 
Wilkerson said, the propaganda message 'can't be the same for the Indian Muslims, as 
it is for the Indonesian Muslims', and 'you can't send the same signals to the 1.5bn 
Muslims, as you're sending to your own people to Ra-Ra them up for the conflict' (23rd 
June 2009, Interview). The DOD recognised this noting how covert PSYOP messages 
were increasingly entering the domestic media (30th October 2003). US Former 
                                                          
6 The article analyses interview data some of which is previously published in Briant (2015) alongside 
new previously unavailable interview data including Austin Branch who held a key IO position during 
these events. This allows new insight into the existing data.  
 
National Security Council Director for Global Outreach, Kevin McCarty7 and others 
expressed a strong belief that the existing audience rules were out-dated. He said 
'every Department, Agency or Office including that of the President, have limitations 
around what they can and can't do. And none of them were written for the world we 
live in now.' (13th March 2013, Interview).8  
It had implications for planning and public debate. DOD became concerned 
with adaptation and finding a solution for what is seen primarily as a coordination 
problem not one of ethical practise. The internet era brought inconsistencies and 
information was harder to control. Austin Branch, who played a lead role in shaping 
practice throughout this period,9 ƐĂŝĚ ‘we have to look at policies and procedures and 
communication  ?rhythms that would allow us to deconflict and coordinate and ensure 
ƚŚĂƚǁĞǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚŝŶŐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĨƌĂƚƌŝĐŝĚĞ ? ? ?th August 2015 Interview). 
Traditional separation of PSYOP and PA was seen by many as a somewhat artificial 
division - evidence that its dominant purpose is the operational one not a normative 
'strategy of truth' (Snow and Taylor, 2006). Loose distinctions between functions were 
renegotiated within defence to increase consistency between covert and overt PSYOP 
messages, PD and PA and coordination was increasingly accepted as necessary to 
ensuring a consistent campaign. 
  
                                                          
7 Also former U.S. Naval Officer, Intelligence Officer, NSC and currently a Commercial Communications 
Consultant 
8 These laws and guidelines are discussed more fully in (Briant, 2015). 
9 US Army Director of IO, Space and Strategic Communications (2002-2006) and Department of Defence 
Senior Advisor in Information Operations (2008-2010) 
It was recognisable early in Iraq, retired US Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner, in 
2003 said the US 'allowed strategic psychological operations to become part of public 
affairs' (8th October 2003). In 2005, Col. Jeffrey Jones, Former NSC Director for 
Strategic Communications and Information concluded that 'traditional dividing lines  ? 
are blurred' (2005: 109). From 2004-2006 Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects 
and Coalition Iraq Spokesman, Gen. Caldwell, sought to change official IO doctrine to 
lessen 'boundaries' preventing coordination. From 2005-2009 amid instability in Iraq 
spending rocketed from $9M to $580M (Vanden Brook, 2013). The article discusses 
the debates and planning and a short timeline below gives further context: 
2001  
September 11 - Attacks on United States 
October 26 - Patriot Act passed 
October 7 - Invasion of Afghanistan 
October 30  W Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) 
Created 
2002  
February 19  W OSI Exposed in media 
February 26  W Rumsfeld declared closure of OSI 
November 8  W UN Resolution 1441 adopted 
2003 
January  W April  W Global Anti-war protests  
February 5  W Colin Powell speech to UN 
Security Council on case for war 
March 20 - Invasion of Iraq P ‘^ŚŽĐŬĂŶĚǁĞ ? 
and embedding media 
April 2  W Jessica Lynch ĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐ ‘ƌĞƐĐƵĞ ? media 
spectacle shaped by Public Affairs statements 
(Loeb & Schmidt, 2003) 
April 6 - US Marine Corps arrive in Baghdad 
April 9 - US Marine Corps place a US flag on 
Saddam Hussein statue, remove, then stage 
manage Iraqis pulling statue down (NPR, 2008) 
October  W  ‘/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐZŽĂĚŵĂƉ ?
(Department of Defense, 2003) 
December 13  W Hussein captured 
2004 
March-April - First Battle of Fallujah  
May  W Abu Ghraib images of abuse emerge 
November 7 WDecember 23 - Second Battle of 
Fallujah  W massive casualties;  
2005 
January 2  W Iraqi Elections 
April  W CIA: Hunt for WMDs exhausted 
November-December  W Media reveal US Army 
paid Iraqi journalists to publish propaganda 
2007  
January -  ‘dŚĞ^ƵƌŐĞ ?announced - 20,000 
American troops deployed  
 ‘&ƵƐŝŽŶĞůů ? established in National Security 
Council targeting thought-leaders (Briant, 2015) 
June-August  W New DOD internet policies  
July 12 - Baghdad Airstrike  W Iraqi civilians and 2 
Reuters journalists killed;  
2008 
September 11 - Joint Special Operations 
Command Cyberwarfare section shuts down 
websites identified as jihadist en masse. 
2009 
January 20 - Barack Obama Assumes Office 
2010 
MISO adopted 
April 5  W Wikileaks released Collatoral Murder 
video showing 2007 Baghdad airstrike - 
Manning arrested under Espionage Act
 
The Impasse 
 As IO funding soared, in the Pentagon, a power struggle between PSYOP and PA 
to shape the future of propaganda was taking place, it peaked between 2005-2009. 
ƵƐƚŝŶƌĂŶĐŚĐĂůůĞĚŝƚ ‘ǀĞƌǇ ?ǀĞƌǇƉĂŝŶĨƵů ?ďƵƚƐĂŝĚƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞ ‘ǁĂƐĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇ
necessary to build the foundations of a policy that would shape how we operate in the 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ? ?th August 2015, Interview). The internet and 
digital technologies challenged the way propaganda was handled. But PAOs strongly 
defended traditional divisions they saw as protecting their credibility. Some, like 
Former US Navy Chief of Information and Former US Special Assistant to the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rear Adm. McCreary10 ?ĨĞůƚƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽďĞ ‘ƚĂŝŶƚĞĚ ? ?
He was critical of changes taking place and felt MISO 'clearly is' encroachment of 
PSYOP into PA:  
                                                          
10 McCreary was also Former Director of Strategic Communication for the National Counterterrorism 
Center. 
'What you've created with [MISO] is they believe their effort is to go into 
foreign audiences and convince everybody that only the United States' way 
is right. ... There is no such thing as strategic PSYOP, PSYOP is an 
operational function, and it was originally designed to convince people to 
do or not do something on the battlefield to give you operational 
advantage. And well they say that's what we're trying to do but at the 
strategic level. ... They're trying to define the ... battlespace as the globe 
and everything's a battle.' (15th October 2013, Interview). 
Rear Adm. Frank Thorp11 succeeded McCreary in key PA roles and both were vocal in 
the impasse with PSYOP.  
 
Early Contestations 
Some pointed to history of the much-criticised  ‘tĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌ ?KĨĨŝĐĞŽĨ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
Influence (OSI)  W a 2001-2002 attempt to lead propaganda - as a primary reason for 
this opposition to newer IO-led changes. Austin Branch said personnel at,  
 ‘K^/ŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ǁĞƌĞƌĞĂůůǇŶŽƚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŽƌƐǁŚŽĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ
 ? this strategic information environment, [or] ƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽĨƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ ?ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚĚŽŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ? public 
perception standpoint. You can understand why the public affairs guys got 
nervous and they stayed nervous ? ?(8th August 2015, Interview). 
Branch pointed out that DOD failed to get the advice of PA in setting up OSI, as the IO 
field was still developing ĂŶĚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĞĂƌůǇŽŶǁĂƐ ‘ŬŝŶĚŽĨŝĨĨǇ ? ?ƚŚĞK^/
                                                          
11 Thorp held positions as Former Special Assistant for Public Affairs, Former First Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Joint Communication) and US Navy Chief of Information (Retired) 
waƐƐƚĂĨĨĞĚďǇ ‘ĂŵĂƚĞƵƌƐ ?ŶŽƚ ‘understanding of the nuances of the ramifications of 
ƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? (8th August 2015, Interview ? ?ǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ŚĞƐĂŝĚ ‘public affairs guys were 
 ?ĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌĞĚƚŽďĞƌĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝƐƚƐ ?ůŝŬĞ IO 
ǁŚŽǁĞƌĞƚƌǇŝŶŐ ‘ƚŽĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇƐŚĂƉĞƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?(8th August 2015, 
Interview). But PAOs exclusion led to some animosity and suspicion. 
 
Branch explained how  ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ŽƌƉƌŽŽĨŽĨ ‘ƌĞƚƵƌŶŽŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ?became 
ĂŶ ‘ĐŚŝůůĞƐŚĞĞů ?ĂŶĚ was concerned how it could be used as leverage by people 
criticising propaganda, 
 ‘ ?ŝĨǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐĂƌĞŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽ
ďĞƌĞĚŽŶĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŶĞǁƚŚĞŶǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇŽƌ
persistency necessary to get the feedback over a year, year and a half, two 
ǇĞĂƌƐĂďŽƵƚĂƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?ĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵŬŶŽǁƉĞŽƉůĞĚŽŶ ?ƚĐŚĂŶŐĞ
attitudes or behaviours overnight  W ƵŶůĞƐƐǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĂŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ?ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ?
audience; ƉĞŽƉůĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŵŝůůŝƐĞĐŽŶĚƐ ? ? ? ?th August 2015, Interview). 
In asseƐƐŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƌĂŶĐŚƐĂŝĚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƚŚƌĞĞ-dimensional 
checks, this is very complex and things happen at near real-ƚŝŵĞƐƉĞĞĚƐ ?ĂŶĚ
ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŝƚ ?ƐŐŽƚƚĞŶĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƵƐ ? ?,ĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐůĂƌŝĨŝĞĚ ? ‘,ĂǀĞƚŚĞƌĞďĞĞŶƚŝŵĞƐ
ǁŚĞƌĞƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ think completely about the second or third order effects? Yes. 
ŶĚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŚĂǀĞůĞĂƌŶĞĚƐŽŵĞŚĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽŶƐ ? ?ƵƚŚĞƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚŝƐŝƐ ‘ĂĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ?
ďƵƚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŶŽƚƵŶŝƋƵĞƚŽŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ƌĂŶĐŚ ? ?th August 2015, Interview). 
To resist the impression of propaganda having little value or unpredictable effects, a 
large industry of contractors now flourish on  ‘proving ? this value.  
That there was a need for change and 'coordination' of some sort, was, by 
2005, accepted by PAOs too - it was the nature of coordination that was disputed. The 
ĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŽƌ ?>ŝŶĐŽůŶ'ƌŽƵƉ ?ƐĐŽǀĞƌƚůǇƉůĂŶƚŝ ŐĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐŝŶ/ƌĂƋŝĂŶĚƌĂď
media led some to feel concerned that such activities undermined trust, harming US 
strategic objectives and the credibility of independent Arab media. Articles were 
American-ŵĂĚĞ ?ĨĂŝůŝŶŐƚŽƉĂƐƐĂƐ ‘ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞ ?ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ?>ŝŶĐŽůŶ'ƌŽƵƉhad no background 
in public relations or the media. But they were also supervised and approved by the 
Army; the activity itself was not in fact, unusual activity for PSYOP, "We don't want 
somebody to look at the product and see the U.S. government and tune out," said Col. 
James Treadwell (Gerth, 2005). But media reaction increased PA concern over 
coordination with PSYOP, and risks of PSYOP outputs damaging the credibility of PA. 
Thorp said 'the Public Affairs folks saw what the psychological operations folks were 
doing on the battlefield in Iraq' and formed the 'perception that, hey  W they're saying 
one thing, the Public Affairs people are saying another thing and the United States is 
looking pretty silly' (24th August 2009, Interview).  
When the expansion and accountability of IO received criticism, the industry 
dug in its heels, journalists at USA Today were targeted with harassment by the owner 
of contractor Leonie, Camille Chidiac (Vanden Brook, 2013). There was distrust and 
concern that PAOs might be facilitating media criticism. One Anonymous IO Officer 
ĐůĂŝŵĞĚŽĨK^/ ‘the folks at OSD(PA) did a smear campaign on them ? ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ ‘sŝĐƚŽƌŝĂ
ůĂƌŬĞ ?ĂŶĚŚĞĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƚŚŝƐŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚĂŐĂŝŶ P ‘we were looking who might have leaked 
the insider story to the USA Today reporters ? ?ŵĂŝů, 25th July 2013).12 Public affairs 
                                                          
12 See Bakir (2013) and Hastedt on role of strategic leaking to further a specific agenda-ďƵŝůĚĞƌ ?Ɛ
strategic aims ?hƐŝŶŐ,ĂƐƚĞĚƚ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ǁĞƌĞƚŚĞse contested allegations confirmed, this type of 
personnel reject flatly any claims of leaking, but it seems widely believed within the IO 
community. Clarke objected to OSI but expressed little knowledge of terf-war conflicts, 
ƐĂǇŝŶŐĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ǁŽƌŬĞĚƉƌĞƚƚǇǁĞůů ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐŚĞƌƚŝŵĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
 
But aĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƌĂŶĐŚ ? ‘ŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƌůŝĞƌĚĂǇƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŐƌĞĂƚƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽ
share some information with public affairs ? ?ĂůŽƚŽĨŝƚǁĂƐǀĞƌǇĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞ
ǁĂƐĂĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ?ĂŵŽŶŐ/KƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůƚŚĂƚ ?ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞƉƵƚĂƚƌŝƐŬ
ǁŚĞŶŐŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŐƵǇƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞ/K ?^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŝƚǁŽƵůĚ
be exposed to media or otŚĞƌĨŽůŬƐ ?ŝŶǁĂǇƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞƵŶŚĞůƉĨƵůƚŽ/K ? ? ? ?th August 
2015, Interview ? ?ƌĂŶĐŚŐĂǀĞĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ‘ŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞǁĞďŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐŽŵĞŚŽǁŝƚ
ŐŽƚŝŶƚŚĞŚĂŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂĂŶĚŝƚ ?ǁĂƐĨƌĂŵĞĚŝŶĂŶƵŶŚĞůƉĨƵůǁĂǇ ? ?ŝƚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ
need to happen that way. There was spin and there was concern from the public 
ĂĨĨĂŝƌƐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƚŚĂƚǁĞĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŚĂĚĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚŝƚĂŶĚ ?ǁŽƌŬĞĚŝƚ ? ?ŝƚ
ǁĂƐƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĂŶĚƵŶŚĞůƉĨƵůƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŚĂƚĚĞďĂƚĞŝŶĂƉƵďůŝĐƐƉĂĐĞ ? ? ?8th August 
2015, Interview).   
High-level disagreements between PSYOP and PA could have a ripple-down 
effect as systems were bypassed to push ideas forward. Briant quotes McCreary (2015: 
151) saying:  ‘The problem was when people tried to run up programs on their own side 
and get it to the boss and not do the coordination. ... and all of a sudden you're 
[finding you contradicted someone else] and, by the way, it's the truth and what 
[they're] trying to propose, it's not so much, or not as transparent. The problem was 
when it went up your own chain and it wasn't shared with the other side, it was 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ƵŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůĞĂŬŝŶŐĚƵƌŝŶŐĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ǁĂƌƌŝŶŐ ?Žƌ ‘ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂů ? W used to wear down 
opponents and block policy (2005419-421). 
primarily done because you knew the other side would disagree with it. And so you 
probably shouldn't have taken it up to begin with!'  
 
Coordination Attempts 
In 2005, Thorp sought to facilitate coordination, recognising audiences can 
conflict; he sought a Public Affairs-friendly coordination. He regarded total separation 
as counterproductive but felt PA should lead the message. McCreary thought the 
coordination needed to be in the 'staffwork' ensuring Public Affairs are consulted and 
'read in' on PSYOP campaigns (15th October 2013 Interview). Thorp said he authored 
the first doctrine to reshape American propaganda into the  ‘^ƚrategic CommunicĂƚŝŽŶ ?
approach (Deputy Sec. of Defense, 2006). But many thought Thorp was obstructive to 
PSYOP.  
 
 Some interviewees said that Thorp's 'doctrine' reflected the fact he was 'a hard-
core Public Affairs person'. His approach according to Matt Armstrong13, reflected a 
view that 'public affairs is the centre of the universe and everything else is mischievous, 
and full of lies and obfuscations' (6th March 2013 Interview). Public Affairs' effort to 
direct the change was opposed by PSYOP personnel including Col. 'Glenn' Ayers14. 
                                                          
13 Member of US Broadcasting Board of Governors, Former Executive Director of the  Advisory 
Commission on Public Diplomacy (28th March 2011 - December 2011) 
14 Col. Ayers was Commanding Officer, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion (Airborne) (2001-2003), 
Psychological Operations Division Chief, Joint Staff (2006-2008), Assistant to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (2003-2005),  Contractor SAIC (2008 - 2012). 
Some could be derisive and Ayers mocked what he saw as Public AffaŝƌƐ ?inability to 
engage with in-theatre audiences and cultures: 
 ‘if you don't understand I'm gonna talk to you louder in English... just so I 
can and get out the public affairs note.' (17th May 2013 Interview). 
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for PA Dorrance Smith indeed adopted a 
hostile stance on Al Jazeera calling them  ‘dŚĞŶĞŵǇŽŶŽƵƌŝƌǁĂǇƐ ? ?h^^ĞŶĂƚĞ ?
2006). But McCreary saw the attitude Ayers expressed as 'fairly cultural...' in the army 
who failed to see communication beyond PSYOP terms: 
'operationally-focussed and really doesn't put the premium on public 
affairs ... I think that's because many of them grew up with PSYOP and they 
just don't understand the communication environment as well as they 
should.' (15th October 2013 Interview).  
 
 Dorrance Smith15 also said coordination that goes beyond 'sanction' by, or 
check and approval by, Public Affairs was potentially problematic: 
'be careful what you wish for because you then become complicit in 
whatever it is... and so how do you then have deniability? Or how do you 
then have credibility? When it then goes awry or becomes public and then 
you have to then go out and defend it... internally that might be brilliant... 
in terms of long-term relationship, I'm not sure that it's all that wise ... 
Public Affairs is not PSYOP and once you go down... you have to be very 
careful about when people were ... convincing you that it's in your best 
interests for them to deceive people for whatever reason and use the 
                                                          
15 Also Former Senior Media adviser to Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad 
media as part of their deception, I just have no comfort in that.' (10th 
September 2013, Interview). 
 
When Ayers mocked PA as ill-equipped for communicating with foreign 
audiences, he had a point. Separation of foreign and domestic has been counter-
productive in many ways in how it divides us from and defines our relationship with 
the international community. Externally imposed 'democracy-building' propaganda has 
merely exposed a sustained gulf of understanding of non-Western cultures in the US.  
Of course, PA is also selective, presenting information in such a way that it 
promotes US Government perspectives. Armstrong pointed out that PAOs don't just 
'throw unadulterated information over the wall'. Thorp's approach according to 
Armstrong is 'I inform, I do not influence. ...It is the general PA doctrine'.16 He said, 
though the word is never applied, PA actually does 'influence' people: 
'ŽŬǇŽƵ ?ƌĞƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŽĨĨŝĐĞƌĨŽƌ&ŽƌƚƌĂŐŐ ?dŚĞŵĂŝŶŐĂƚĞŝƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽ
close for construction .. ?^ŽǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ
ƌŽƵƚĞƐ ?ǁŚǇĂƌĞǇŽƵĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ?zŽƵ ?ƌĞĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĂƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵǁĂŶŶĂ
ƐŚŽǁƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƌŵǇĐĂƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚďǇƚŚĞǁĂǇĚŝĚǇŽƵƌĞĂůŝƐĞ
ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?EŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĂƚ ?ŶŽƚũƵƐƚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ďƵƚ
ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ‘ŚĂŶŐŝŶŐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?was one of the key 
components of PSYOP.' (Armstrong, 6th March 2013 Interview).  
Many see it as a false or arbitrary distinction given the overlap, but there 
were subtle differences that fed the bureaucratic struggle. Thorp insisted that for 
                                                          
16 Yet Thorp was key spokesman on the Jessica Lynch story, held up as an example of Iraq war 
misinformation (See: House of Representatives Report, 2008).  
an information campaign to be strategically coordinated, there needs to be 'one 
set of rules' and it is necessary to decide 'whether the Public Affairs rules are 
right, the Psychological Operations rules are right or we need a new set of rules' 
for guiding propaganda (24th August 2009, Interview).  
 
Pentagon Ju-Jitsu  
 Commanding General of the Combined Arms Centre (2005-7) Petraeus 
transformed the structures responsible for the 'information' sphere, continuing once 
he took over Central Command in 2008. But disagreement persisted holding DOD 
policy on internet activities back until 2007. Internet activities were governed by 
PSYOP regulations - legislated at a time before the internet was anticipated. Ayers, said 
that, when he was Psychological Operations Division Chief 'we got the Deputy 
Secretary of Defence to sign ? two new policies - the Trans-Regional Web Initiative 
(TRWI  W later, Regional Web Initiative Program) and Interactive Internet Activities (IIA) 
policy - ĂŶĚ ‘ƉƵƐŚĞĚƚŚŽƐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?(17th May 2013, Interview). 17  
The form the policies took served to further blur the functions of PSYOP 
personnel and PAOs (Silverberg and Heimann 2009)and became a key period of 
struggle before resolution of the impasse. Ayers along with other interviewees saw 
Thorp and McCreary as responsible for preventing 'progress' and obstructing approval 
of the policies:  
                                                          
17 The regulations were the 'Policy for DOD Interactive Internet Activities' (IIA) which enabled two-way 
communications using blogs, emailing, chat-rooms etc (Deputy Sec. of Defense, 8th June 2007), and 
'Policy for Combatant Command Websites Tailored to Foreign Audiences' (only non-interactive 
websites) (Deputy Sec. of Defense, 3rd August 2007). 
'There was more than reluctance [to coordinate Psychological Operations 
with Public Affairs], there was actual stonewalling, and physical, 
bureaucratic ju-jitsu to make sure that Psychological Operations authorities 
were not done.' (Ayers, 17th May 2013, Interview). 
 
 The IIA policy Ayers applies to online PA activities and 'programs, products and 
actions that shape emotions, motives, reasoning, and behaviours of selected foreign 
entities' (Deputy Sec. of Defense, 8th June 2007). Silverberg and Heimann argued it 
'might be viewed as fusing PSYOP and Public Affairs into a generic communication 
effort', since it applies to both PSYOP personnel and PAOs and does not specify 
different activities (2009: 82). PA activities were included in a similar definition to 
PSYOP, the only difference being the words 'shape' and 'influence'. PAOs are stated to 
target media, but their activities are not distinguished from PSYOP. The term 'shape' is 
undefined and open to interpretation. Silverberg and Heimann state it 'establishes a 
hybrid PSYOP-Public Affairs model' (2009: 86) and steps into State Department 
territory - PD. 
 
 There is a requirement for IIA to be 'true in fact and intent' but while 
'attribution' is specified, there is broad scope for the Commander to navigate this due 
to 'operational considerations' (Deputy Sec. of Defense, 8th June 2007; Silverberg and 
Heimann, 2009: 85-6). This was a point of contest for PAOs, Ayers said, viewing it as a 
terf-war: 
'that was the first time ... in that document, that we had articulated the 
different types of attribution and who could use them. And specifically it 
says in there that PA can only work in the realm of attributable 
information. Psychological Operations could work in all three of them. PA 
does not like that.'18 
This was because it excluded PA from influencing PSYOP messaging, which they feared 
would re-enter the country and be seen by a domestic audience - their area of 
concern. From Ayers' perspective: 
 'They want to have control of information cause when it blows up in their 
faces, and they're standing on a podium, they look at it from that 
standpoint. 'How am I going to spin this when it comes out?'' (Interview: 
17th May 2013). 
 
Ayers described putting pressure on Thorp to pass TRWI, IIA and delegation ƚŽ ‘ ?- ? ?Ɛ ? W 
lower ranking personnel outside the Pentagon: 
 ‘He specifically sat on those packets and would not either approve them or 
disapprove them, for months. Until ... I had to get ... my one-star Air Force boss 
to go in and sit down with Frank Thorp, in his office, and read through the 
entire message about TRWI... And he kept on saying things like, [whiney voice] 
'I don't understand this' ... my IO force boss, said ... this great thing. He looked 
across the table at him ...one-star to one-star and said, 'You did go to university 
right? What about this message is not apparent to you, that you don't 
understand? Frank.''  
                                                          
18 100% non-attributable military IIA can be authorised by the Defense Secretary, though this is rare as 
'there are other people who do that' kind of activity (Ayers, 17th May 2003, Interview).  
Ayers used influential networks to press changes through and navigate resistance from 
PA: 
'Well, here's how I got it through. I always punched above my weight as a 
full Colonel in the Pentagon, so I got my three-star boss, I got the Director 
of the Joint Staff, who was another three-star... I got a couple of ...Senior 
Executive of Services within USDI [Under Secretary for Intelligence] within 
policy, to... help me push this through... Because ... my first assignment at 
the Pentagon was ? Military Assistant for Secretary Rumsfeld and for 
Secretary Wolfowitz. So I went for a year to the War college and I came 
back in, and I still knew all the networks at the Pentagon. I was friendly 
with quite a few high people, so ...I used my powers do that. Those three 
things that I pushed through ... it was the IIA, TRWI and the O-6 thing and 
every single one of those I had to use the Pentagon Ju-jitsu and get around 
public affairs. Public Affairs was the key impediment to everything we tried 
to do, because once again going back to what I said Emma, they look upon 
all information as in the realm of Public Affairs information... but 
Psychological Operations uses the same information.  But we only may 
choose to use ... 80% of it ... to modify the behaviour of a target audience. 
Public Affairs thinks everything needs to be totally open, everything needs 
to be spoken about, everything needs to be ... attributed. Not the case.' 
(17th May 2013, Interview). 
One solution Ayers stated was to cut the ASD for PA and Under Secretary to the 
Defence for Policy and Special Operations in the Pentagon out of approval, which 
would give them greater liberty. Here Thorp describes the cultural differences in PA:  
'There were folks in the psychological operations world could not 
understand why in a million years we would talk about ... for instance 
investigations... the whole Abu Ghraib thing. There were those who said 
'why should we even talk about that publicly?' - Because if we talk about it 
the enemy will take advantage of it. Well that's true, but the issue is not 
not to talk about it the issue is not to do it. It will become public one way or 
another.' (Emphasis Added. Thorp, 24th August 2009, Interview). 
 
Delegating out 
 PA's concerns clashed with the PSYOP ƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐ ? policy to increase their 
freedom to manoeuvre using online and digital media. One change implemented was 
that in the internet policies, 'contrary to two decades of practise, [a] delegation 
empowers commanders to conduct information operations at their discretion' where 
'previously they had to have senior-level Departmental approval' (Silverberg and 
Heimann, 2009: 82). Significantly Ayers pushed the PSYOP approval process outside 
the Pentagon; he said: 
'Those Commanders... in the area... knew the environment better than 
anybody else... so if they had ... an [Non-Commissioned Officer], school-
trained...  from a PSYOP unit ... or an Officer, and it worked through the 
proper procedures, they could approve at an O-6 level [that of Naval 
Captains or Colonels in the other services]' (17th May 2013, Interview). 
Ayers' planned to change authorities for PSYOP to permit approval by lower-level 
officers, this meant that: 
'if you had, a, PSYOP-trained NCO on your staff, or an Officer ... you could 
do tactical level [PSYOP] products, without getting higher approval... prior 
to that, [approval] was all the way at a  2-star or 3-star level' (17th May 
2013, Interview). 
Ayers said: 
'what I said is if you're gonna put out a, a leaflet or a handbill, in Arabic that 
says, 'dont crap in the water and drink it', you don't need a 2 star General 
to sign off on that! Ok?' (17th May 2013, Interview). 
This suggests PSYOP is used for seemingly-trivial 'public information' purposes -
messages support a variety of objectives and some may or may not be attributable or 
truthful. 
 
 Ayers sought to remove Pentagon PA from planning, increasing PSYOP's 
autonomy, because:  
'At the beginning of the conflict, we ... actually had to get ... all of our 
products that we were dropping over Afghanistan, approved by the 
[Assistant Secretary of Defence (ASD) for] Public Affairs and by the Under 
Secretary of Defence for Policy and Special Operations. We had people 
looking at our leaflets in DC... this was back in 2001 and saying, 'this word is 
spelled wrong, or you have a comma in the wrong place' - it's because we 
had to send it to them in English!' 
He got tactical PSYOP approval transferred to personnel ranking as low as 'PSYOP-
Trained NCO' in theatre, when he was Joint Staff J-39 Deputy Director Global 
Operations, and: 
'out of the Pentagon, so I could get 'em away from Frank Thorp. And I could 
get him away from Policy.'  
This strategy deliberately cut chain-of-command oversight to give greater autonomy in 
theatre:  
'We were being second guessed... and 'what if...' and all this other kind of 
stuff by people who had no clue sitting in DC. So I took it upon myself when 
I came in on Joint Staff, that approval was gonna get out of ... the 
Pentagon.' (Ayers, 17th May 2013, Interview). 
But this change removes a layer of checks, reducing oversight and accountability, for 
the purpose of excluding PAOs from protesting PSYOP they thought was problematic. 
 
 Dorrance Smith during 2006-9 was ASD for PA, and recalled some of these 
discussions from his time in office. He explained why it was important that 'front 
office' approval was gained:  
'I pretty much was an advocate of Public Affairs being open and 
transparent in everything it did... I think that my position was consistent 
with the people who went before me like Torie Clarke and Larry De Rita... I 
think it's the role of [ASD Public Affairs] to be open and transparent and 
you can't have your foot in all of the various... there's certain areas where, 
as Public Affairs, you really shouldn't be involved in the planning, the 
execution, the process ...I can't really remember a ... big conflict between 
what I was doing in Public Affairs and what some military operation was 
involved in. There were times where there would be these policy 
discussions and ... the PSYOP people or the people who were in Special Ops 
would try to inculcate in doctrine or in policy that they could basically 
operate, you know, alone by themselves and without any transparency and 
of course Public Affairs would object to the extent that, that's where you 
get in trouble is where you do these 'off the shelf' operations that no-one 
knows about and hasn't had anybody in the front office sanction and 
approve it and then when the press find out about it the first- they don't go 
to the PSYOP people for a comment, they come to my office for a 
comment. I think a general example, there were times in policy discussions 
where a General would try to argue a certain point of view to the Secretary 
in order to try and make it doctrine or make it policy and I would ... as Head 
of Public Affairs we would 'non-concur'' (10th September 2013 Interview). 
Smith said 'I never felt that Secretary Rumsfeld ever put the Office of Public Affairs or 
me personally in a position that would've compromised our ability to do our jobs' he 
said 'whether or not [Rumsfeld] satisfied the itches of the PSYOP community' he wasn't 
sure (10th September 2013, Interview).  
  
 But despite PA claims to have 'non-concurred' on such attempts, policies 
delegating PSYOP approval out of the 'front office' were evidently passed. PA's 
arguments and ability to counter were structurally sidelined as authorities were 
processed, the operational imperatives had institutional priority over normative 
elements PA organisational culture. Due to his closeness to Bush, some journalists also 
ƐĂǁ^ŵŝƚŚ ?Ɛrole as political - preoccupied with defending the White House. One 
reporter ƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶ ‘,ĂƌƉĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚƚŚŝƐǁŝƚŚƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌƐdŽƌŝĞůĂƌŬĞĂŶĚ>ĂƌƌǇ
ĞZŝƚĂ ? ‘you could go to them for help and for information. We see the cleaning lady 
more than Dorrance. ? ?^ŝůǀĞƌƐƚĞŝŶ, 2007).   
 
Coordination 
This all happened during a period of wider media hostility to Rumsfeld which 
also had an impact on PA. US Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs 
Doug Wilson (who did not serve at the Pentagon during the Bush Administration) 
observed that as a result of this hostility, Pentagon Public Affairs Office was gradually 
marginalised, and until 2008 or even later, 'most of the war-related communication 
that was done out of the Pentagon was done out of information operations' (10th May 
2013 Interview). Some of Silverberg & Heimann's concern over changing practise was 
also felt by PA officials from this later period. Wilson for example criticised the de facto 
blending of PSYOP and PD. He said that in Defense, "This middle kind of plant that 
grew up ... some called it MISO, some called it Strategic Communications" - it was "this 
middle area that caused everybody such heartburn." For him, it was "a glaring example 
of how little on the non-military side of public diplomacy was working effectively" 
(Interview: 10th May 2013). 
 Since Frank Thorp retired as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Joint 
Communication) in 2009, there has also been less opposition to coordinating PA with 
the other tools. As Armstrong put it, 'what was starting the revolution in there [was 
that] you had Rosa Brooks over in policy, and Doug Wilson in PA, and Austin Branch at 
IO. You had three very competent, respected people who got along very well ...and 
you did not have Frank Thorp in there anymore.' (6th March 2013 Interview). Wilson 
came in to the Pentagon as ASD for Public Affairs in 2009 and had a different approach 
to coordination. He described this change, 'I never thought Information Operations 
was a bad word. I wanted to defuse the tensions between the Public Affairs and the 
Information Operations shops. My approach has always been that communications is a 
broad spectrum, from the overt to the covert, and it's a matter of using the tools in 
tandem.' He observed that some in the PA branch 'thought that if you dealt with the 
dark side of communications, you were getting your hands sullied. I think that's the 
result of spending too much time carving up the field into stovepipes.' Wilson said, 'I 
brought with me a desire to develop a holistic communications team. And not feeling 
that Austin Branch was, you know, from Planet Mars.' (10th May 2013, Interview). It 
was suggested that it was 2009 before Public Affairs were able to 'get around the 
planning table' again:  
'During my tenure, some under Gates, but particularly under [Leon] 
Panetta, Public Affairs started to regain its seat at the table as the place 
that developed and coordinated communication strategy for the 
Pentagon.' (Wilson, 10th May 2013, Interview). 
This impacted his approach when he was the 'point person for communication on 
Wikileaks in the Pentagon.' He explained how his coordination was international, 
cross-governmental and of course, between PA and the IO capabilities: 
'It was international in scope because [the emails] ranged from things that 
could be embarrassing to people, to things that could be life threatening. It 
involved several different agencies - the military, intelligence, diplomatic 
cooperation among the communicators was superb really. It was 
something that was done in real time. You had issues of free press vs issues 
of national security. And I was quite proud of how our government handled 
it. We met with the New York Times, we were able to go through [the 
documents in question]. We couldn't prevent the publication but we were 
able to work with them in terms of identifying things that truly would put 
lives at risk. There was tremendous cooperation between the military and 
intelligence communities, great cooperation between the United States 
and Foreign Governments ...communicating in advance things that could 
be embarrassing, and things that could be a national security risk. And 
when it came to... between me and [Senior Advisor, then Director of 
Information Operations] Austin Branch, I mean he certainly was aware of 
and part of the discussions about how we were going to be handling it.' 
(Wilson, 14th May 2013, Interview). 
 
 Eventually, the systems and cultures of Public Affairs at DOD changed in 
response to pressure:  
'ĨŽƌĂůŽŶŐƚŝŵĞŝŶƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚǇŽƵ ?ƌĞůŽŽŬŝŶŐŝŶ ?WǁĂƐǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐƚŚĞǁŚŝƚĞ
horse and everything else was dark and simply being in the same room 
ƚĂŝŶƚĞĚWĂŶĚƐŽƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĞǀĞŶďĞƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƵƚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŚĂƚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ
breaking down at the personal level. You have some folks in the field 
working very well together and properly integrating the activities.' 
(Armstrong, 6th March 2013, Interview). 
Armstrong gave an example of where he saw IO take the lead,  
'this senior officer...was IO, and smart, and the junior officer was PA, and 
the PA deferred to the IO guy ... and he led the initiative. He was essentially 
in charge of the communication synchronisation.'  
But he confirmed that this could be inconsistent and depended on the initiative of the 
Commander, it 'really varied' and sometimes,  
'you had the ...commanding officer ... only wanting his PA person in the 
room and figured IO was something to be brought in later and sprinkled 
onto a project.'  
dŚŝƐǁĂƐƐĞĞŶĂƐĂƉƌŽďůĞŵďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ? ‘KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞƚŚĞWŐƵǇ ?ƐŶŽƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐlocally [in 
theatre], the PA guy is thinking back in US primarily to the US public, congress and the 
Pentagon  W the IO ŐƵǇƚĞŶĚƐƚŽďĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚůŽĐĂůůǇĂŶĚƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ? ? ? ?Original 
emphasis. Matt Armstrong, 6th March 2013, Interview). Former Director of the Joint 
PSYOP Support Element and Commander of 4th Psychological Operations Group in Iraq 
(2003) Col Jim Treadwell stated that: 
'From my vantage point it appears that most PA officers working in the 
field are more focused on supporting their operational commanders than 
they were 20 years ago.  By that I mean they are still informing the public, 
but they are doing so understanding that the information they provide will 
have an influence.  Perhaps you could say they are informing with a 
purpose.' (6th May 2013, Email). 
The change in culture in PA was produced through what Bakir et al. (forthcoming) 
might deem 'Organised Persuasive Communication' in this case utilising 1) discursive 
persuasion and 2) a degree of coercion and incentivisation (their power having being 
made contingent on this change) as well as 3) a generational change in personnel.  
 
Branch stressed the importance of training - that proportionality of second and 
third order effects on a population were weighed, ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞƌŝƐŬŝƐ
ƚŽŽŐƌĞĂƚ ? (8th August 2015, Interview).19 But Branch stated that now if ƉůĂŶŶĞƌƐ ‘ƚŚŝŶŬ
that there is going to ďĞĂƐĞĐŽŶĚŽƌƚŚŝƌĚůĞǀĞůĞĨĨĞĐƚĂƚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?ƐƐƉĂĐĞƚŚĞǇ
ŚĂǀĞƚŽĨŝŐƵƌĞĂǁĂǇƚŽĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ ? ?And also  ‘ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞĨŽůŬƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞĞƋƵŝƚǇŝŶŝƚ ?
ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐŝƚŝƐƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƉĂĐĞ ? ? ?th August 2015, Interview). Yet TRWI websites, remained poorly 
coordinated with State Department efforts (Vanden Brook, 19th November 2013). 
Legally, military PSYOP must be associated with a specific mission but Silverberg and 
Heimann state that they were stepping into public diplomacy,  
'labelling the ongoing effort a 'global war' or even a 'worldwide irregular 
campaign' greatly expands the range of activities that can be justified as a 
'military mission.'' (2009: 79). 
They warn if their mission is indistinct  ‘the need for funds becomes open-ended' 
(2009: 84 and 90). 
Furthermore, with planners focus on 'deconfliction' there is assumed legitimacy 
of dividing the  ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƉĂĐĞ ?in its entirety (domestic and foreign) into occupied 
territory for propagandĂƐƚƌĞĂŵƐǁŚŽŚĂǀĞ ‘ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ?over managing it - personnel must 
consider effects of ƚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŽĞƐŝŶ ‘ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?ƐƐƉĂĐĞ ? (ie territory occupied by 
other government personnel). But audiences themselves are rarely acknowledged to 
have a legitimate claim. Whether domestic or foreign, friend or foe when seen as 
                                                          
19 KƚŚĞƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐƐŚŽǁƚŚŝƐǁĂƐŶ ?ƚƚƌƵĞŽĨĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ?ƌŝĂŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
 ‘ƚĞƌƌĂŝŶ ? or operational 'battlespace' people are not considered actors holding  ‘ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ?
in the information environment of their own minds.20   
These struggles illuminate the tensions in the relationships both with 
journalism, as their reliance on public affairs and protection of sources was viewed as 
ŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐWK ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŝŶĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůďĂƚƚůĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞpublic, 
who rely on a media - demarcated as the  ‘ďĂƚƚůĞƐƉĂĐĞ ?ĨŽƌƉƌŽƉaganda - to inform their 
ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ ? US press reporting shows over-
reliance on 'official' government sources (Entman, 2004), and 'excludes coverage of 
military alternatives' (Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2008: 71). Certain basic knowledge is 
necessary to consider propaganda consensual. The  ‘ũƵ-ũŝƚƐƵ ? ŵĂǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ ‘ƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚ ?
institutionally by 2009 but, with a few exceptions, public discussion was limited. When 
criticism from PA and the State Department was vocalised, IO was gaining power and 
ƚŚĞŝƌĨĞĂƌŽĨWK ?ƐĐůŽƐĞŶĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂĂƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌďĂƐĞůĞƐƐ
or not, shaped policy and impacted the role and power of PA in shaping external 
communication.  
 
Conclusion 
The propaganda war involved a cultural struggle; not just with the in-theatre 
audience, the international community or the American public, but also within 
Government. Cultural differences between streams of propaganda presented a 
 ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ĨŽƌĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚŵĂǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŚĞĂůƚŚŝĞƌ from a democratic 
                                                          
20 ŶĚŝƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽůŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉĂƌƚƐŽĨƚŚŝƐ ?ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐƉĂĐĞ ?ŵĂǇŽĨ
course also be underpinned by differentials in incentivisation, physical coercion or force in the physical 
'terrain' (Bakir et al., forthcoming). 
perspective. Infighting was partly power-play between personnel who forward their 
own department. The contradictions were resolved institutionally, prioritising 
operational imperatives with little protection of media freedom. For accountability, 
governments have to communicate. But at very least, the rules governing propaganda 
use should, in a democratic society, be transparent and subject to enquiry. Whether or 
not the population supports different forms of propaganda use, how it is regulated, 
and changes to the rules which govern it (when, how, if and where it is used) must be 
debated. Only transparency and openness to critical social science and journalistic 
enquiry can ensure planning and policy changes are genuinely in the public interest 
and this example evidences how balances of institutional power powerfully shapes 
these debates.  
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